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Best available copyAbstract 
This paper models the regulatory decision to close a bank as a call option. 
A  two-equation model of bank failure, which treats bank closings as 
regulatorily timed events, is constructed from the call option closure model 
and estimated for bank failures occurring from 1984 through 1989.  The 
two-equation model is also compared with two single-equation models in terms 
of both in-sample and out-of-sample predictive accuracy. 
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Banking was relatively free of failures from the late 1930s to  the mid-1960s. 
In the 1970s,  bank failure rates increased but still remained at relatively 
low levels.  The most notable development in the 1970s was that large banks 
started to populate the ranks of failed banks.  During the 1980s, bank 
failures increased dramatically and as in the 1970s the failures were not 
limited to small banks.  Multi-billion  dollar institutions such as Continental 
Illinois Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, First Republic Bancorp of Dallas, 
and MCorp of Houston,  joined the ranks of the banks that either failed or 
needed assistance from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation  (FDIC)  to 
remain open. 
When compared to the failure rates for general business,  bank failure 
rates during the 1980s are relatively low.  For example, the 145 bank failures 
in 1986 translates into an annual failure rate of one percent,  much lower than 
the 8.7 percent annual failure rate for general businesses in 1986.  Even 
though bank failure rates are still low relative to general business failure 
rates, the ability to statistically model and predict bank failures is 
important from a public policy standpoint.  For one,  the ability to detect a 
deterioration in'bank  condition from accounting data reduces the costs of 
monitoring banks by reducing the need for on-site examinations  (see  Benston 
et. a1 [1986,  ch. 10] and Whalen and Thomson [1988]).  furthermore,the 
ability to predict failures reduces the cost of bank failures to the FDIC. 
Extensive literature on bank failures exists.'  Statistical 
techniques used to predict and/or  classify failed banks include multivariate 
discriminate analysis  (see  Sinkey [1975]),  factor analysis and logit 
. . 
.  . 
.  . 
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1987]), and a two-step logit regression procedure suggested by Maddala  (1986) 
(see Gajewski  (1988])  to classify banks as failed and nonfailed.  Recently, 
this work has been extended by Demirguc-Kunt (1989a,  1990) to include market 
data and a model of the failure decision.  Unfortunately, market data are 
available for only the largest banking institutions and the majority of banks 
that fail are small, with no market data available. 
This study uses book data from the June and December Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council Reports of Condition and Income  (call 
reports) from 1983 through 1988 in statistical models of bank failure. 
Maddala's (1986)  two-step logit regression procedure is compared with single- 
equation models for classifying banks as failed or nonfailed.  The analysis 
implicitly recognizes that insolvency and failure are separate events and the 
failure equations contain proxy variables to control for this.  Furthermore, 
measures of local economic conditions are incorporated into the analysis. 
The historically high number of  failures for each year in the sample 
period allows each year to be investigated separately.  Previous studies he: 
to pool the failures across years to get a sufficiently large failed bank 
sample, making it difficult to construct holdout samples and to do 
out-of-sample forecasting.  This was especially true for tests across years 
The sample in this study is not limited in this way.  Once failures for one 
year are classified by the model, failures in subsequent years can be used t- 
determine the out-of-sample predictive ability of the model.  For example, the 
failure prediction model used to classify failures in 1984 can be applied to 
the 1983 data for banks that fail in 1985 and 1986. 
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The failure of a depository institution occurs when a regulator declares that 
it has failed.  Bank chartering agencies at the state and federal level have 
the authority to close  However, for simplicity, our discussion of 
the failure process will assume that the FDIC has the ability to fail banks. 
Furthermore, we assume that all bank liabilities are insured  The 
decision to allow a bank to fail can be studied in an option-pricing 
framework.  Merton  (1977, 1978) shows that deposit insurance can be modeled as 
the European put option, p(A,T-t;D),  to sell the assets of  the bank, A, to the 
FDIC for the value of the deposits, D, at time t-T.  Following Buser et al. 
(1981),  the FDIC is assumed to levy a fixed-rate explicit deposit insurance 
premium,  and a variable-rate implicit deposit insurance premium.  The 
implicit premium consists of a regulatory tax and an American call option 
expiring at t-T,' 
(1) 
where  the charter value of the bank, and A-D +  exercise price. 
The first term in the call option in equation (1),  consists of the value 
of the deposit insurance subsidy,  plus firm-specific  options for future 
business activities, 6. Some of these firm-specific options may be lost 
when a bank fails. The exercise price is the market value of  equity, 
which includes  (see  Kane and Unal [1990] and Thomson (1987]) and the 
nonactuarial  costs to the FDIC associated with the failure of a bank, 
(see Kane [1986;  1989, ch. 4))  If we set  0,  then the call option 
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the value of enterprise-contributed capital, A  D  < 
When  0,  the FDIC will exercise its call option at some point 
after the value of enterprise-contributed capital becomes negative. 
represents constraints on the FDIC's  ability to close banks.  Kane (1986) 
divides  into four components, which include  :  information constraints  , 
legal and political constraints,  implicit and explicit funding 
constraints,  , and administrative and staff constraints, c,. 
represent the monitoring costs the FDIC must incur to detect the insolvency of 
a financial institution.  The FDIC faces a trade-off between these costs and 
expected loss when an institution is found to be insolvent.  Therefore, higher 
costs imply reduced value of the FDIC call. 
arise out of principal-agent problems that exist in bureaucratic 
regulatory agencies.  Kane (1989, ch. 4) models bank and thrift regulatory 
agencies as self-maximizing bureaucracies whose primary task may be conceived 
as acting as the agent for taxpayers  (the  government's  principal) to ensure a 
safe and sound banking system and to minimize the exposure of the taxpayer to 
loss.  These regulators also must cater to a political clientele who are 
intermediate  or competing principals.  As  illustrated by the cases of Lincoln 
Savings and Loan in California and Vernon Savings and Loan in Texas, the 
political costs to the regulator of closing insolvent institutions can be 
quite large.  Principal-agent problems also arise from the post-government 
career opportunity set facing a regulator.  As Kane  (1989)  points out, 
individual regulators have incentives to not take actions in the public's 
interest if they are seen to damage their post-government career prospects, 
especially if the developing crisis can be pushed off into future and into 
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price of  the FDIC  call option and  results in the exercise of  the call after 
enterprise  -contributed capital becomes  negative. 
The  ability of  the  FDIC to close an institution is constrained by  the 
value  of  the deposit-insurance put option held by  the depositors of  the bank 
relative to the explicit and  implicit balance  in the insurance  fund.  The 
explicit insurance reserve is the value of  the FDIC's  fund net of  outstanding 
commitments and guarantees related to past, current, and  future failures.  The 
implicit funding source incorporates the FDIC's  line of  credit with the 
Treasury and  the implicit backing of  the fund by  the Treasury.  However, 
tapping the Treasury line of  credit or drawing on  the implicit Treasury 
guarantees  (for example,  the issuance of  notes by  the FSLIC)  has  political 
costs associated with it.  The  forbearance policies adopted by  the now-defunct 
FSLIC  after it became  insolvent in the early 1980s  graphically illustrate the 
importance  of  this constraint on  the ability of  the FDIC  to close institutions 
as they are found  to be  insolvent.  As funding constraint costs, 
increase (the real value of  the insurance reserve decreases),  the exercise 
price of  the FDIC's  call option rises and  the value of  the call 
When  there are a large number  of  troubled institutions, or even a few 
large troubled institutions,  the ability of  the FDIC  to close these 
institutions is affected by  the size and  ability of  its staff.  Staff 
constraints arise for two  reasons.  First, since the FDIC's  budget is part of 
the federal budget,  there are incentives  to minimize  staff; second,  the 
ability of  the FDIC  to attract and  retain good  people is limited by  its 
ability to provide compensation  packages  that are competitive with the private 
sector.  Both  of  these have  been problems  for the FDIC  in recent years.  , 
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the greater the exercise price of the FDIC call option. 
From the call-option formula,  the probability a bank will be closed 
af  ter its enterprise  -contributed capital is exhausted is 
(2)  P(FAIL  I  A  A  c,, 
Modeling the closure decision as a call option suggests that the empirical 
model for failure should be a two-step two-equation model that includes a 
solvency equation and a failure equation  (see  Demirguc-Kunt [1989a,  1990] 
and Gajewski  [1988]). 
where  :  market-value solvency of bank j, 
i'th  predetermined variable related to 
random error term, 
- dummy variable equal to  if bank j is failed, zero 
otherwise, 
predicted value of y  from equation  (3);  theoretically it 
is enterprise-contributed capital, 
constraints on FDIC's  ability to close insolvent banks, 
random error term, assumed to be correlated with 
The solvency equation explicitly recognizes that insolvency is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the FDIC to exercise its closure 
call option.  In Demirguc-Kunt's (1989a, 1990) studies, which use market data, 
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from government-contributed capital  (primarily  in the form of 
deposit-insurance  subsidies and forbearances).  Unfortunately,  it is  difficult 
in practice to do  this using book measures of solvency like those employed 
here and in Gajewski  (1988).  Therefore, equation  (3)  may not be able to 
control for government-contributed capital in book solvency measures.  An 
alternative motivation for equation  (3)  is to recognize the simultaneous 
nature of book solvency measures  (see  Maddala [1986]).  In practice,  this is 
the primary justification for the two-equation system used here and in 
Gajewski  (1988) . 
III. The Data 
Bank failures from July 1984 through June 1989 comprise the failed bank 
sample.  A  bank is considered failed if it is closed, merged with FDIC 
assistance,  or requires FDIC assistance to remain open.  Our list of bank 
failures is taken from the FDIC's  Annual Report from 1984 through 1987 
and from FDIC press releases.  It includes only FDIC-insured commercial banks 
in the United States  (excluding  territories and possessions). 
The non-failed sample includes banks in the United States operating 
from June 1982 through June 1989 that filed complete call reports.  This 
sample is drawn randomly from the call reports and attention is paid to ensure 
that the non-failed sample is representative of the population  of nonfailed 
banks.  For instance, the majority of banks in the population are small banks; 
therefore, the non-failed  sample is drawn in a manner that ensures that small 
banks are adequately represented.  Data for the failed banks are drawn from 
the June and December call reports for 1982 through 1988. Data for each failed 
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failure date.  A  total of  1,736 banks  are included in the nonfailed sample. 
The  number  of  failed banks  in the sample  in each year appears  in table 
Data  on  economic condition used in the study are drawn  from  several 
sources.  State-level gross domestic output data are obtained  from  the Bureau 
of  Economic Analysis for the years 1980  through 1986.  County  level employment 
data are taken from  the Bureau of Labor  Statistics County Statistics Files for 
the years 1980  through 1986.  State-level personal income  data are taken  from 
the Bureau  of  Economic Analysis annual personal income  files for the years 
1981  through 1988,  and business failure data are taken from  Dun  and  Bradstreet 
for the years 1982  through 1988.  All of  the economic condition data are 
annual data.  Therefore,  the business-failure and personal income  data were 
matched with the December  call report data of  the same  year and  the following 
June  call-report data.  The  gross domestic output and employment  data were 
matched with the December  and June call-report data in a similar manner,  but 
with a two-year  lag. 
IV.  The Empirical Model 
The  purpose of  this study is to model  bank  failures of all sizes.  This 
precludes  the use of  market  data in equations  (3)  and  (4).  because stock 
market  data are only available for a limited number  of  large banking 
organizations.  Therefore,  the proxy variables used  in this study are 
based on balance sheet and  income  data from  the call reports.  Equations  (3) 
and  (4) used in the study are specified as follows: 
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proxy variables.  The dependent variable in the solvency equation, NCAPTA, is 
defined as the ratio of primary capital  (book  equity capital plus the reserve 
for loan losses) net of nonperforming loans to total  This 
variable is similar to Sinkey's (1977)  net capital ratio variable, which is 
the ratio of primary capital net of classified assets to total 
NCAPTA should be a better proxy for enterprise-contributed capital than a 
primary capital-  to-assets ratio because it adjusts equity capital for the 
impact of bad loans.  In addition, Sinkey  (1977)  and Whalen and Thomson  (1988) 
show that similar proxy variables are highly related to the true condition  of 
the bank. 
The lagged value of the dependent variable,  is 
included in equation  (3a)  to increase the predictive power of the equation. 
This is important because the predicted value of NCAPTA, 
is a regressor in equation (4a).  Because we are primarily interested in 
equation  (3a)  as a predictor of solvency,  we do not correct the standard 
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interpret its coefficients. 
The next set of variables in equation (3a). NCLNG, LOANHER,  LOANTA, 
LIQ, OVRHDTA,  AVGDEP,  and INSIDELN,  are all variables included in equation 
(4a)  that are also related to solvency, and are described below.  Finally, 
four measures of economic conditions in the bank's  markets are included to 
incorporate the effects of local economic conditions on the solvency of the 
bank.  These economic conditions variables include:  BOUTDVH,  which is a 
Herfindahl index constructed from state-level gross domestic output by the 
one-digit standard industrial classification code in the state where the bank 
is headquartered;  which is county level unemployment in the county 
where the bank's  main office is located; CPINC, which equals the percent 
change in personal income in the state where the bank is headquartered; and 
BFAILR, which is the small-business failure rate in the state where the bank 
is headquartered. 
Equation  (4a)  is the failure equation, and DFAIL is the dummy  variable 
for failure.  The first variable in equation  (4a)  is  the 
predicted value of the solvency proxy from equation  The remaining 
regressors in  (4a)  are included to proxy for the effects of 
and  on the failure decision.  Note that many of the regressors may 
proxy for one or more of these constraints. 
The natural logarithm of average deposits per banking office, AVGDEP, 
is used as the proxy for the enterprise-contributed portion of the charter 
value, 6.  The level of deposits per banking office should be positively 
correlated to the value of the  banking franchise and therefore positively 
related to failure. 
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included as regressors in equation  to proxy  for the  FDIC's  information 
system,  or  in the call option.  These variables are related to the FDIC's 
ability to decipher the true condition of  a bank  and,  therefore,  the FDIC's 
ability to close a bank when  it becomes  insolvent.  The  better these variables 
are able to predict insolvency,  the lower  the information costs faced by  the 
FDIC.  In essence, by  including these proxy variables in equation  (4a), we  are 
incorporating a statistical monitoring or early warning  system  in the spirit 
of  those used by  the FDIC  to complement  on-site 
The  first three early warning system variables are proxies for asset 
quality, NCLNG,  and  portfolio risk, LOANTA  and LOANHER.  NCLNG  is the ratio of 
net charge -offs to total loans.  This variable should be  positively related to 
failure.  LOANTA  is the ratio of  total loans net of  the loan loss reserve to 
total assets.  It is the weight of  risky assets in the total asset portfolio 
and,  therefore, a proxy for portfolio risk.  LOANTA  should be  positively 
related to failure.  Finally, LOANHER  is a loan portfolio Herfindahl 
constructed from  the main  loan classifications on  the call reports." 
This is a measure  of  overall loan portfolio concentration and,  therefore, 
diversifiable portfolio risk.  LOANHER  should be positively related to 
failure  . 
The  next  three early warning  system variables are proxies for 
operating efficiency, OVRHDTA,  profitability, ROA,  and  liquidity, LIQ.  OVRHDTA 
is overhead as a percent of  assets, which should be positively related to 
failure.  ROA  is the return on  assets and  should be negatively related to 
failure.  In addition,  ROA  may  also proxy  for legal and political constraints. 
As we  have  seen with the forbearance policies adopted for thrift institutions, 
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than insolvent  institutions that are losing money.  As a proxy  for  ROA 
should also be  negatively related to failure.  Finally,  LIQ is defined as the 
ratio of  nondeposit liabilities to cash and  investment  securities and  should 
be  positively related to failure.  Note  that a liquidity crisis that may  arise 
out of  insolvency might force the FDIC to close an insolvent institution by 
increasing the political costs of  not acting.  Therefore,  the less liquid the 
institution,  the greater the probability it will  be closed. 
BRANCHU  is included in the regression to control for differences  in 
state branching laws.  BRANCHU  is a dummy  variable that equals one  if the bank 
is in a unit banking state and zero otherwise.  The  presence of branching 
restrictions reduces  the failure-resolution options for the FDIC and  therefore 
represents a  legal constraint on  the FDIC's  ability to close a 
Therefore,  BRANCHU  should be negatively related to failure. 
DBHC  is a dummy variable equal  to one  if the bank is part of  a bank 
holding company  and zero otherwise.  Banks  in  bank holding companies  are less 
likely to be closed by  the FDIC  if there are other solvent holding company 
subsidiaries.  This variable is based on  the "source of  strength doctrine" 
espoused by  the Federal Reserve.  Source  of  strength represents a regulatory 
philosophy  that the parent holding company  should first exhaust its resources 
in an  attempt to  make  its banking subsidiaries solvent before the FDIC 
intercedes.  Prior to the Financial Institutions Reform,  Recovery,  and 
Enforcement  Act  of 1989  (FIRREA), the source of  strength doctrine had  no  teeth 
because regulators could not force bank  holding companies  to bail out 
insolvent bank  subsidiaries and  the FDIC  had  to resort to complicated 
administrative and legal procedures to seize holding company  assets that were 
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for legal and administrative costs faced by  the FDIC, should be  negatively 
related to failure. 
Two  of  the FDIC  constraints,  and  are difficult to proxy  for 
directly in this study because of  the cross-sectional nature of  some  of  our 
tests.  However,  there is a variable, SIZE,  which is indirectly related to 
both  and c,.  SIZE is the natural logarithm of  total assets held by  the 
bank.  The  larger the bank,  the more  complicated its portfolio and 
transactions are likely to be  and,  therefore, administrative costs of 
resolving bank failures should be higher for large banks  than for small ones. 
Holding  the loss per dollar of  assets constant,  larger banks  impose  greater 
losses on  the FDIC  fund  than smaller ones.  Therefore,  the funding constraint 
is more  likely to be binding as the total assets of  the insolvent bank 
increase.  Finally,  the political fallout from  a large-bank failure is much 
greater than for small ones,  so SIZE  also proxies for political constraints. 
All  three constraints imply  that SIZE  should be  negatively related to failure. 
The  last regressor included in equation  (4a), INSIDELN,  is a measure 
of  fraud.  INSIDELN  is the ratio of  loans to insiders to total assets.  Loans 
to insiders and  their friends are a major  source of  fraud in failed bank 
cases.  Although  insolvency due  to fraud, or fraud-related losses in insolvent 
institutions are difficult to detect, the presence of fraud increases the 
exposure of  the FDIC fund  to loss if the bank is not closed promptly and also 
reduces political opposition to the bank's  closure.  Therefore,  the presence 
of  fraud increases the probability that the FDIC  will  close the bank and 
INSIDELN  should be positively related to failure. 
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To  judge  the classification and  predictive accuracy of  the  two- 
equation model,  the following one-equation model  is specified. 
Equation  (5) is simply equation  (4a) with  the actual value of NCAPTA  used  to 
proxy  for solvency instead of  the predicted value of NCAPTA  from 
equation  (3a).  Since we  are also interested in the effects of  local or 
regional economic  conditions on  the probability of bank failure, equation  (5) 
is also estimated with economic condition variables as regressors. 
V.  The  Empirical Results 
The  panel nature of  the data allows two  types of  tests to be  done.  First, the 
data are pooled  in over time (using  the June 1983  through  the December  1988 
call reports),  and  the predictive accuracy of  the models  is assessed for up  to 
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and June 1986 call reports, we assess the in-sample and out-of-sample accuracy 
of the models. 
Results from the Two-Equation Model in the Pooled Sample 
A  two-step procedure is used in estimating equations (3a) and (4a).  First, 
(3a) is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and the predicted value 
of NCAPTA is saved for use as a regressor in equation  Equation (4a) is 
then estimated using  Both equations  (3a)  and  (4a)  are 
estimated using data at each call date for the nonfailed sample and for banks 
in the failed sample whose failure date is between six and 12 months, 12 and 
18 months, 18 and 24 months, 24 and 30 months, 30 and 36 months, 36 and 42 
months, and 42 and 48 months from the call date.  The results appear in tables 
2 and 3 respectively.  In  table 2 we see that the adjusted  ranges from a 
low of 0.8266 for regressions using banks that fail 36 to 42 months from the 
call report date to a high of 0.8645 for banks that fail six to 12 months from 
the call report date  Since the main purpose of estimating equation 
(3a) is to construct the solvency regressor for equation (4a), it is  important 
that the equation has a good fit. 
Table 2 shows that  the coefficient on  is 
negative and significant for banks failing within 30 months of the call date 
and positive for banks failing from 30 to 48 months from the call date. 
However, it is only positive and significant for the 36- to 42-month 
subsample.  The positive sign on  for banks failing after 30 months is 
paradoxical because it indicates book solvency is positively related to 
failure.  This, however, is not a new result.  One possible explanation of 
this result is that banks beginning to experience difficulties readjust their 
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for the purpose  of cosmetically improving  their capital positions. 
The  coefficient on  NCLNG,  is negative for all banks  and 
insignificant for all the regressions except  the 30-  to 36-month and  42-  to 
48-month subsamples.  The  expected  sign for  is positive.  the 
coefficient on  LOANHER,  is positive (expected sign is negative) and 
insignificant for all subsamples. 
is positive and significant at the one  percent level for all 
subsamples.  In other words,  banks whose  loan portfolios make  up  a higher 
percentage  of  their assets have  a higher probability of  failure.  The  sign on 
is consistent with LOANTA  being a proxy  for portfolio risk. 
the coefficient on LIQ, is positive and significant for all subsamples except 
30  to 36  months  and 42  to 48  months,  where it is positive and  insignificant. 
predicted by  our model,  the less liquid a bank,  the greater the probability 
the FDIC  will  close it when  the bank becomes  insolvent. 
As  predicted by our model,  the coefficient on  OVRHDTA,  is 
positive and significant at the one  percent level for all subsamples.  In 
other words,  banks  that are more  efficient are less likely to be  closed by  the 
FDIC when  they become  insolvent  than are inefficient banks.  is 
negative and significant for all subsamples.  As  predicted by  the model, 
insolvent banks  that are profitable are less likely to be  closed than 
unprofitable ones.  This result is consistent with the forbearance policies of 
the federal bank and  thrift regulators during the 1980s.  Thrifts had  to be 
both insolvent and losing money  to be  targeted for closure prior to the 
passing of  FIRREA in 1989. 
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subsamples.  This is consistent with INSIDELN proxying for fraud,  which, 
according to  our model, should be positively related to closure.  On the other 
hand, the coefficient on the branching dummy,  is positive and 
significant in all subsamples.  The sign on  is opposite that predicted 
by the theory and indicates that BRANCHU may be proxying for geographical 
diversification of assets and liabilities or,  since most unit banking states 
are in the Great Plains area and the Southwest, BRANCHU may be proxying for 
regional economic activity.  As we shall see when we look at the regression on 
equation (5a), it appears that BRANCHU  is proxying for the latter. 
is negative and significant in all subsamples.  As 
predicted by our theory, bank holding company affiliation reduces the 
probability a bank will be closed when it is found to be 
The coefficient on SIZE,  is also negative and significant in all 
subsamples.  This is consistent with SIZE proxying for the higher 
administrative, funding, and political costs associated with closing larger 
banks.  Finally,  the coefficient on AVGDEP  (the  proxy for charter value), 
is positive and significant in all subsamples.  A  positive sign 
on  is consistent with our modeling of the closure decision  (as  in 
Buser et al. [1981]) as a call option on the bank's  charter. 
Single-Equation Models 
An alternative to the two-equation model is the estimation of a 
single-equation model,  such as equation  (5).  This model does not attempt to 
correct for the endogeneity of NCAPTA.  If the error terms in equations  (3) 
and  (4)  are independent, then there is no difference econometrically between 
estimating equations (3a) and (4a) or simply estimating equation (5).  In 
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predictive accuracy, a poor fit of the data to the solvency equation may 
reduce the predictive accuracy of the failure equation enough to cause us to 
prefer a single  -equation model like equation  (5)  to the two-equation model. 
As  seen in table 4,  the results from estimating equation  (5)  are 
similar to the two-equation model results in table 3.  However, there are a 
few noteworthy differences in the results.  First, as in table 3,  is 
positive for banks failing over 30 months from the call date and positive and 
significant in the 36- to 42-month subsample.  However,  is  also 
positive and significant in the 42- to 48-month subsample for equation  (5). 
Second,  in both models turns up with the urong sign  (negative),  but 
is negative and significant in six of the seven subsamples in table 4, 
compared with two in table 3.  In all, the results of both models are 
tent with the call option closure model  ; however, based on this 
criteria, the empirical results of the two-equation model are slightly 
superior to those of equation  (5). 
The  two-equation model estimated in this paper attempts to control for 
the impact of regional economic conditions on the solvency of a bank by 
including proxy variables for economic conditions in the solvency equation. 
Therefore, its slightly better empirical performance based on theoretical 
criteria may simply be due to the extra information  associated with the 
inclusion of  the economic condition variables.  To investigate this 
possibility, we estimate equation (5a) as our second alternative model.  The 
results of this model appear in table 5. 
Table 5 shows that for the first eight regressors the results for 
equation  (5a) are virtually identical to those for equation  (5).  However, 
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once the economic condition proxies are included as regressors.  Furthemore, 
is negative in two of the subperiods.  The coefficients on BHC 
,  SIZE  and AVGDEP  are also essentially the same for 
both (5) and (5a), except that  is insignificant for the 42-  to 
month subperiod for equation (5a). 
What is  interesting about the results in table 5 is that  and 
are negative and significant for all subperiods.  In other words, failure is 
negatively related to state-level economic concentration  (BOUTDVH),  to county 
level unemployment  (UMPRTC),  and to changes in state-level personal income 
(CPINC).  If BOUTDVH  and UMPRTC are controlling for differences in the 
relationship between book and market solvency across regions, then we would 
expect  and  to be positive.  The negative sign on 
CPINC is, however, consistent with its use as a proxy for differences between 
market and book solvency across regions.  On the other hand, BOUTDVH and 
UMPRTC could be picking up increased political constraints associated with 
closing banks in depressed regions like the Southwest.  These political 
constraints increase as the number of insolvencies in a region increases. 
Finally, the coefficient on BFAILR,  ,  is negative and 
insignificant for all subsamples. 
Tables 6, 7, and 8 contain the results for the three models estimated 
using cross-sectional data from the June call reports in 1984, 1985, and 1986, 
and from failures occurring in the subsequent calendar year.  Cross-sectional 
estimation was done for two reasons:  first, we wanted to indirectly test the 
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investigate the ability of the model to  predict failures outside the sample. 
To facilitate out-of-sample  forecasting,  we also split the nonfailed sample 
into two random samples of 868 banks.  One sample is to be used in in-sample 
forecasting and the second is to be used for out-of-sample forecasting.  As 
seen in tables 6,  7,  and 8,  with the exception of  and 
there does not appear to be a significant difference between the coefficients 
of each model across years.  Therefore,  the results of the tests in tables 3, 
4,  and 5 do no appear to be sensitive to the pooling 
In-Sample Classification Accuracy 
The second criteria for judging bank failure models is the 
classification accuracy of the model.  First,  how well does the model do in 
discriminating between failed and nonfailed banks within the sample?  Second, 
how well does the model discriminate between failed and nonfailed banks 
outside the sample? 
For the pooled data, only in-sample forecasting is done.  Tables 3,  4, 
and 5  contain the overall classification accuracy of the three models along 
with each model's type-I and type-I1 error.  Type-I error occurs when a failed 
bank is incorrectly classified as a nonfailed bank.  Type-I1 error occurs when 
a nonfailed bank is classified as a failed bank.  The overall classification 
error is the weighted sum of the type-I and type-I1 errors.  Typically, there 
is a trade-off between type-I error and overall classification accuracy. 
Since type-I error is seen to be more costly than type-I1 error for failure 
prediction models, the "best" model in terms of prediction is one that jointly 
minimizes type-I error and overall classification error. 
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very good.  Using the ratio of failed to nonfailed observations in the sample 
as the probability cutoff point, we find that type-I error is as low as 7.438 
percent for equation  (5)  in the 6- to 12-month subsample and as high as 29.801 
percent for equation (4) in the 42- to 48-month subsample.  Overall 
classification error ranges from 6.856 percent in the 6- to 12-month sample 
for (5a) to 21.381 percent in the 42-  to 48-month sample for equation  (4).  As 
expected, both type-I errors and overall classification errors increase with 
time to failure.  Equation (5) has the lowest type-I error for the 6- to 
12-month  and  12- to 18-month subperiods while equation (Sa) has the lowest 
type-I error for the remaining subperiods.  Furthermore,  (Sa)  has the lowest 
classification error of all of the models.  Therefore, based on in-sample 
forecasting accuracy from the pooled data, equation (5a) appears to be the 
"best?  -  model. 
Out-of-Sample Forecasting 
One reason for studying bank failures is to construct statistical 
models of failure that can be used to identify failures in the future.  Such 
models are referred to as off-site monitoring or early warning systems in the 
literature and are used by regulators as a complement to on-site examinations 
of banks.  Out-of-sample forecasting yields information on  the usefulness of 
the bank failure model as an examination  tool.  Out-of-sample forecasting also 
gives us information on the stability of the failure equation over time. 
The out-of-sample forecast is done using the estimated coefficients 
from the cross-section logit regressions on equations (4a),  (S),  and (5a), 
using data from the June 1984,  June 1985, and June 1986 call reports and half 
of the nonfailed sample.  The failed sample consists of all banks failing in 
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coefficients for equations  (4a),  (5),  and  (5a) estimated over  this sample 
appear  in tables 6,  7, and 8 respectively.  The  second  half of  the nonfailed 
sample,  is used as the nonfailed holdout  sample  for forecasting.  Three 
failed holdout samples were  also constructed for equations  (5) and  (5a) 
(except for June 1986,  for which only  two  could be  constructed) and  two  failed 
holdout samples  were  constructed for equation  (4a).  The  first failed holdout 
sample  consists of banks failing in the second calendar year following the 
call report.  The  second failed holdout sample consists of  banks  failing in 
the third calendar year following the call report.  The  third holdout sample 
[not available for equation (4)  in any year or for equations (5)  and  (5a)  in 
1986]  is made  up  of  banks  failing in the fourth calendar year following the 
call report. 
The  results for this out-of-sample  forecasting experiment appear  in 
table 9.  Table  9, panel A  shows  the results using the June 1984 call report 
data to predict failures in 1986,  1987,  and 1988.  The  cutoff point (PPROB) 
for classifying banks  as failed or nonfailed is the ratio of  failed to 
nonfailed banks  from  the in-sample  regressions.  Other  cutoff points yield 
similar results.  With  PRROB  0.132,  table 9-A  shows  that the three models 
misclassify between 10 and 11  percent of  the banks  in the holdout sample using 
and 1986  failures.  The type-I error rate indicates  that all three 
models misclassify over  two-thirds of  the failures, while  roughly  two  percent 
of  the nonfailed sample  (type-I1 error rate) is misclassified.  Looking at  the 
results for the 1987  failure and 1988  failure holdout samples  (using  as 
the nonfailed sample  in both cases),  table 9-A  shows  that both type-I errors 
and  overall classification errors for all three models  increase as we  attempt 
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results for June 1985  and June 1986  call reports are similar to those using 
June 1984  data.  As  was  the case in the in-sample  forecasting,  equation  (5a) 
appears  to dominate  the other two  models  in terms  of  both its overall 
classification accuracy and  type-I error rate for all of  the holdout samples. 
Given  the high type-I error rates, one  might  question the usefulness 
of  the models  as early warning models  of  failure.  However,  the  type-I error 
rate could be  lowered by  lowering  PPROB  enough  so that the type-I error rates 
are acceptable.  What  is interesting from  the standpoint of  an early warning 
application is the low  classification error and  the low  type-I1 error.  If one 
wanted  to use  this model  to determine which  banks  should be  examined  next,  low 
type-I1 error is extremely  important because  the FDIC has limited examination 
resources. 
In practice,  the first out-of-sample experiment is of  little use for 
designing early warning models because it requires that we  be  able to identify 
failures in subsequent years in order  to apply it.  Therefore, a second 
out-of-sample experiment,  which  is able to mimic  an early warning model  in 
practice,  is performed.  Using  the June 1984  call-report data, we  estimate our 
three models  using the entire nonfailed sample  and  the failures occurring  in 
the next calendar year.  The  coefficients are then used  to do  out-of-sample 
forecasting using June call data for 1985,  1986,  1987,  and 1988  on  the 
nonfailed sample and failures in the calendar year following the call report 
as the holdout samples.  Again  the  PPROB  is set equal to the ratio of  failed 
banks  to nonfailed banks used in the in-sample  logit regressions. 
The  results of  the out-of-sample forecasting in table  10 show  that 
using  the 1984 version of  the failure model,  our out-of-sample classification 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyerror ranges from a high of 5.965 percent for equation (5) in June of 1986 to 
a low of 2.537 percent for equation (5a) in June of 1988.  Type-I error ranges 
from a high of 51.880 for equation (4a) in June of 1985 to a low of 22.078 
percent in June of 1989.  It is somewhat curious that the out-of-sample 
classification accuracy of all three models increases as we get further and 
further from the call date of the in-sample experiment.  Also, for the June 
1985 and June 1986 experiments equation  (5)  does the best job of out-of-sample 
prediction while equation  (5a)  dominates on this criteria for June 1987 and 
June 1988.  Again, note that the type-I error for the out-of-sample 
regressions could be lowered at the expense of the type-I1 error  (and  overall 
classification error) by lowering PPROB. 
The performance of all three models in the second out-of  -sample 
forecasting experiment suggests that they could be used as part of an 
early warning system of failure.  Note, however, that our failure equation is 
designed to model the failure decision and not insolvency itself.  A true 
early warning system would be designed to detect insolvency, which is  a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the bank to be closed. 
IV. Conclusion 
Bank failures are regulatorily timed events.  The decision to fail a bank can 
be modeled as a call option whose value is a function of the bank's  charter, 
its solvency, and costs to the FDIC of closing the bank.  A two-equation model 
that explicitly recognizes that insolvency and failure are separate events is 
set up and estimated.  Two single-equation models were also estimated to 
provide a benchmark against which to judge the two-equation model.  Overall, 
the two-equation model performs quite well in testing.  It has good 
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Furthermore,  for the two-equation model, the majority of the regress  ion 
coefficients are significant with the correct sign in all of the subsamples 
used in the study. 
Comparing the two-equation model with the alternative single-equation 
models,  we find that the single-equation models perform slightly better in 
terms of in-sample and out-of-sample classification  accuracy  (both  in terms of 
type-I  and type-II  errors).  This,  however, does not indicate a rejection of 
the two-equation  model in favor of the single-equation models;  rather,  it is 
an indication that we need to improve the predictive accuracy of the solvency 
equation in the two-equation model.  Finally, the addition of economic 
condition variables to the single-equation model's failure equation generally 
improves the predictive accuracy of the single-equation model. 
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1)  Bank  failure studies include Avery  and Hanweck  (1984), Barth et. a1 
(1985) ,  Bovenzi  et al. (1983), Demirguc-Kunt  (1989a,  1990), Gajewski 
(1988,  1989), Hanweck  (1977), Lane  et  al. (1986,  1987), Meyer  and  Pifer 
(1970),  Pantalone and  Platt (1987), Rose  and Scott  (1978), Santomero and 
Vinso  (1977), Short et  al. (1985),  Sinkey et al. (1987), and  West  (1985). 
For  a review of  this literature see Demirgiic-Kunt  (1989b). 
2)  The  decision to close a bank is usually based on  some  measure  of  solvency. 
Prior to 1933,  the solvency  test applied in national bank closing cases 
was  either incapacity to pay  obligations as they matured or 
balance-sheet insolvency.  Since then,  the Office of  the Comptroller of 
the Currency has  tended  to use only  the former,  "maturing 
obligations" test, although the statutory basis for the latter, 
"balance-sheet" test remains  in the statue books.  Compare  12  U.S.C. 
Section 191  (balance-sheet or maturing obligations)  with id., 
Section 91 (usually interpreted as "maturing obligationsn  only). 
3)  For  most  banks,  all of  their deposit liabilities are implicitly or 
explicitly insured and the majority of  bank liabilities are deposit 
liabilities.  Therefore,  this assumption should not qualitatively affect 
the results. 
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Best available copy4)  This option is similar to Brumbaugh and Hemmel's (1984)  deposit-insurance 
call option.  When the FDIC chooses to exercise its call option on the 
bank's  charter it must purchase the deposit insurance put option back from 
the depositors.  The net loss to the FDIC equals 
where a is the percent of charter value remaining after the bank is 
closed and  is the value of the deposit insurance put. 
5)  A complete model for valuing federal deposit insurance would have to 
account for this charter-related call option.  Such analysis would require 
the use of complex options  (see  Geske [1979] and Stulz [1982]). However, 
since this paper is primarily aimed at modeling bank failure we will 
concentrate on the call option held by the FDIC. 
6)  Enterprise-contributed capital is the market value of  the bank's  equity 
net of government-contributed capital, mostly consisting of the subsidized 
value of deposit insurance forbearances and guarantees  (see  Kane and Unal 
[1990] and Thomson [1987]). 
7)  Funding constraints are not always separate from the political 
constraints.  As  the value of the insurance fund decreases, politicians 
and self-maximizing bureaucrats have incentives to cover up the emerging 
weakness of the fund by adopting forbearance policies aimed at delaying 
the closing of insolvent institutions.  For evidence of this type of 
behavior by regulators see Kane (1989, ch. 5). 
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Best available copy8)  If  and  are uncorrelated, then one can simply estimate 
equation (4) directly,  using y  instead of  . 
9)  The call report data were screened for errors.  Banks in the failed and 
nonfailed samples for whom screening revealed errors in their data were 
deleted from the sample.  In addition,  banks in the nonfailed sample who 
were missing a June or December call report between 1982 and 1988 were 
also deleted. 
10) In addition, stock market data is usually only available for bank holding 
companies and not for individual banks. 
11) Nonperforming loans is the sum of loans 90 days past due but still 
accruing, and  nonaccruing loans. 
12) Classified assets is an item found only on a bank's  confidential 
examination report and it is measured infrequently and often unavailable 
to researchers. 
13) The purpose of early warning systems is to detect the deterioration  of a 
bank's  condition between scheduled examinations so that the FDIC can move 
that institution up in the on-site examination queue  (see  Whalen and 
Thomson (1988]).  Papers that look at early warning systems include 
Korobow and Stuhr (1983),  Korobow et al.  (1977),  Pettway and Sinkey 
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Best available copy(1980),  Rose  and  Kolari  (1985),  Sinkey  (1975, 1977,  1978), Sinkey and 
Walker  (1975),  Stuhr and  Van  Wicklen  (1974), Wang  et al.  (1987), and 
Whalen  and Thomson  (1988). 
14)  The  loan portfolio classifications used  to construct the loan 
portfolio Herfindahl  include:  real estate loans,  loans  to depository 
institutions, loans  to individuals, commercial  and  industrial loans, 
foreign loans,  and agricultural loans. 
15)  For  a discussion of  the different failure-resolution techniques available 
to the  FDIC see Caliguire and Thomson  (1987). 
16) The  OLS (logit) regressions are estimated using the proc reg (logist) 
regression procedure in SAS. 
17)  Banks  failing within six months  of  the call report date were  not  included 
in the sample  because a call report is not available until three to six 
months  after the date of  the call report. 
18)  In the cases where  all  or the majority of  bank subsidiaries of  a bank 
holding company  were  closed at  once  (for example,  Bank  Texas  Group,  First 
Republic Bancorp  of  Dallas and MCorp  of  Houston),  the failed bank 
subsidiaries were  aggregated into a single observation and  treated as a 
single failure in our tests. 
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Best available copy19) We  also did cross-sectional regressions using all of  the data (both failed 
and nonfailed)  for the June 1984,  June 1985  and June 1986  call reports and 
the entire failed sample  and  failures in the next calendar year  for these 
call reports.  The  results were  not materially different from  those 
reported in tables 6, 7, and 8. 
20)  The  in-sample forecasting properties of  the cross-sectional equations 
yield similar results at each call report period.  Equation  (5a) appears 
to dominate  equations  (4)  and  (5)  in terms both type-I error and  overall 
classification accuracy (see tables 6,  7, and 8). 
21)  When  the data were  collected, we  collected information on failures up  to 
four years before the failure.  Since  the lagged value of  NCAPTA  is used 
in the two-equation model,  we  can only construct holdout samples  up  to 
three years from  the call date instead of  four for equation (4a). 
22)  One  other thing to note is that with the exception of  failures after June 
1989,  our nonfailed sample  is free of failures in the future.  Therefore, 
the type-I1 error rates of  other studies and overall classification rates 
are high-biased because, as our  results show,  failure models are capable 
of  classifying at  least 25  percent of  future failures within four years 
of  the call report data. 
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Table  1 
Number  of  Failed Banks  in the 






a.  Number  of banks  in nonfailed sample  in each year  is 1,736. 
b.  1989  failure numbers  are  for the  first six months  of  the year. 
Source:  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Annual Reports and  press  releases. 
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Best available copyTable 2 
OLS Regression Results For Equation (3a) From the Pooled Sample 
X < Failures Occurring  Y Months of the Call Report Date 
6 to  12  12 to 18  18 to 24  24 to 30  30 to 36  36  to 42  42 to 48 
0.02443'  0.02934  0.02692  0.03517  0.03762  0.04199  0.03766 
(  (  ( .0021)*  ( .0023)*  ( .0026)*  ( .0029)*  ( .0031)* 
0.08606  0.82980  0.83117  0.79306  0.77208  0.75778  0.79238 
( .0036)*  ( .0036)*  ( .003a)*  ( .0040)*  ( .0043)*  (.0046)*  (.0054)* 
-0.05580  0,00100  -0.01594  0.07035  0.09196  0.08956  0.12619 
(  0111)  ( .0116)  ( .0126)  ( .0138)*  ( .0162)*  ( .0183)*  ( .0240) 
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Best available copyTable 2 (cont.) 
X < Failures Occurring  Y Months of the Call Report Date 
a.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
b.  Adjusted 
c.  Total number of observations, both failed and nonfailed. 
Notes:  *  Significant at 1 percent. 
Significant at 5 percent. 
Significant at 10 percent. 
Source:  Author. 
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Best available copyTable 3 
Logit Regression Results for Equation  (4a)  From  the Pooled Sample 
X  < Failures Occurring  Y  Months  of  the Call Report Date 
6  to 12  12 to  18  18 to 24  24  to 30  30  to 36  36  to  42  42  to 48 
-4.68530  -7.28915  -9.07995  -10.5591  -10.8012  -9.19922 
( .8217)  ( .7918)*  ( .8164)*  ( .8790)*  ( .9600)*  (1.438)' 
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Best available copyTable 3  (cont.) 
X < Failures Occuring  Y Months of the Call Report Date 
a.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
b.  Model chi-square with 12 degrees of freedom. 
c.  Type I error:  percent of failed banks classified as nonfailed. 
d.  Type II error:  percent of nonfailed banks classified as failed. 
e.  Class:  percent of all banks misclassified. 
f.  PPROB:  probability cutoff value, approximately equal to the ratio of 
failed and nonfailed observations. 
Notes:  *  Significant at 1percent. 
Significant at 5 percent. 
Significant at 10 percent. 
Source:  Author. 
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Best available copyTable 4 
Logit Regression Results for Equation (5)  From the Pooled Sample 
X  Failures Occuring  Y Months of the Call Report Date 
6 to 12  12 to 18  18 to 24  24 to 30  30 to 36  36 to 42  42 to 48 
-3.74423  -5.88586  -7.95867  -9.33218  -9.28732  -10.4187 
( .8745)  ( .7946)*  ( .7760)*  (.  7948)*  (.  8479)*  ( .9195)*  (1.503). 
-42.3731  -30.5644  -18.5722  -11.0295  1.77564  5.66029  7.70472 
(1.707)-  (1.620)-  (1.525).  (1.567)'  (1.724)  (1.667)-  (1.932). 
-5.74819  -7.98422  -11.2572  -13.2754  -19.6326  -14.3427  -14.3208 
(3.726)  (4.081)~  (4.463)t  (4.914)~  (5.872)-  (6.265)t  (8.209)~ 
1.01056  0.49413  0.88768  0.37164  0.79117  0.89250  0.94932 
( .6121)#  ( .5420)  ( .5255)'  (  .5503)  (  .5584)  ( .5920)  ( .6900) 
6.90372  8.42196  9.11404  9.43382  9.62790  8.69855  8.34784 
( .5933)*  (.  5470)-  ( .5243)*  (  .5393)*  (  .5683)*  (.  5911)-  ( .6765)* 
0.48045  0.47223  0.38353  0.32872  0.11556  0.37975  0.37919 
( .1284)*  (  .1229)*  (1141  (  .1209)*  (  .1887)  ( .2360)  ( .3761) 
201.736  207.206  257.080  275.101  244.812  257.004  284.084 
(27.61)-  (26.02)'  (25.27)-  (25.72)'  (27.42)'  (29.03).  (33.53). 
-45.0675  -55.2277  -60.8254  -63.1525  -77.5459  -65.2046  -70.2942 
(5.690)'  (5.889).  (6.438)'  (6.801)-  (7.999)'  (8.574)-  (10.45)- 
28.8434  32.2487  32.2761  32.4707  30.0495  31.2010  30.8855 
(4.104)-  (3.601)-  (3.433)-  (3.457).  (3.561)'  (3,749)'  (4.192)- 
0.25096  0.45066  0.47279  0.34310  0.49027  0.45098  0.80699 
( .1308)  #  (  161)  ( .1097)*  ( .1131)*  ( .1182)*  ( .1270)*  ( .1492)* 
-0.53971  -0.54570  -0.54763  -0.45105  -0.37342  -0.42407  -0.41455 
( .1279)*  (.  1128).  ( .1059)*  ( .1086)*  ( 1140)  ( ,1210).  ( .1408)' 
-0.92820  -0,85646  -0.84981  -0.74691  -0.65532  -0.66411  -0.45685 
( .1087)*  ( .0963)*  ( .0918)*  ( .0909)*  ( ,0970)-  ( .1073)*  ( .1209)* 
0.42278  0.54163  0.64972  0.71536  0.66293  0.68673  0.55454 
(336)  (176)  (1120)  ( 1123  (1181)'  (.1295)*  ( .1459)* 
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Best available copyTable 4 (cont.) 
6 to 12  ------- 
2h829.50~ 
~ype1'  7.438 
6.918 
Class*  6.939 
0.042 
Failures Occurring  Y Months of the Call Report Date 
a.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
b.  Model chi-square with 12 degrees of freedom. 
c.  Type I error:  percent of failed banks classified as nonfailed. 
d.  Type 11 error:  percent of nonfailed banks classified as failed. 
e.  Class:  percent of all banks misclassified. 
f.  PPROB:  probability cutoff value approximately equal to the ratio of 
failed and nonfailed observations. 
Notes:  *  Significant at 1 percent. 
Significant at 5  percent. 
Significant at 10 percent. 
Source  :  Author. 
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Best available copyTable 5 
Logit Regression Results for Equation (5a) From the Pooled Sample 
X < Failures Occuring  Y Months of the Call Report Date 
6 to 12  12 to 18  18 to 24  24 to 30  30 to 36  36 to 42  42 to 48 
-0.16296  -1.41553  -3.27400  -4.70151  -4.52455  -5.86895 
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Best available copyTable  5  (cont.) 
X  Failures Occuring  Y Months  of  the Call Report Date 
a.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
b.  Model  chi-square with 16  degrees of  freedom. 
c.  Type  I error:  percent of  failed banks classified as nonfailed. 
d.  T  e  II error:  percent of  nonfailed banks classified as failed. 
e.  C  ass:  percent of  all banks  misclassified. 
f.  PPROB:  probability cutoff value approximately equal to the ratio of 
failed and nonfailed observations. 
Notes:  * - Significant at 1 percent. 
Significant at  5  percent. 
Significant at  10  percent. 
Source:  Author. 
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Cross-Sectional Logit Regressions on Equation (4a) 
Using Data From the June 1984, June 1985 and June 1986 Call Reports-. 
Call Date  8406  8506  8606 
1985 Failures  1986 Failures  1987 Failures 
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Best available copyTable 6 (cont.) 
a.  Using the predicted value of NCAPTA from equation (3a) and half of the 
nonf  ailed sample. 
b.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
c.  Model chi-square with 12 degrees of freedom. 
d.  Type I error:  percent of failed banks classified as nonfailed. 
e.  Type II  error:  percent of nonfailed banks classified as failed. 
f.  Class:  percent of all banks misclassified. 
g.  PPROB:  probability cutoff value approximately equal to the ratio of 
failed and nonfailed observations. 
Notes:  *  Significant at 1 percent. 
Significant at 5  percent. 
Significant at 10 percent. 
Source:  Author. 
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Best available copyTable 7 
Cross-Sectional Logit Regressions on Equation  (5) 
Using Data From the June 1984, June 1985 and June 1986 Call Reports. 
Call Date  8406  8506  8606 
1985 Failures  1986 Failures  1987 Failures 
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Best available copyTable 7 (cont.) 
a.  Using half of the nonfailed sample. 
b.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
c.  Model chi-square with 12 degrees of freedom. 
d.  Type I error:  percent of failed banks classified as nonfailed. 
e.  Type II error:  percent of nonfailed banks classified as failed. 
f.  Class:  percent of all banks misclassified. 
g.  PPROB:  probability cutoff value approximately equal to the ratio of 
failed and nonfailed observations. 
Notes:  *  Significant at one percent. 
Significant at 5 percent. 
Significant at 10 percent. 
Source:  Author. 
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Best available copyTable 8 
Cross-Sectional Logit Regressions on Equation (5a) 
Using Data From the June 1984, June 1985 and June 1986 Call Reportsa 
Call Date  8406  8506  8606 
1985 Failures  1986 Failures  1987 Failures 
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Best available copyTable 8  (cont.) 
Call Date  8406 
1985 Failures 
'15  -22.9118 
(7.740)' 
8506  8606 
1986 Failures  1987 Failures 
-30.1852  28.0164 
a.  Using half of the nonfailed sample. 
b.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
c.  Model chi-square with 12 degrees of freedom. 
d.  Type I error:  percent of failed banks classified as nonfailed. 
e.  Type II error:  percent of  nonfailed banks classified as failed. 
f.  Class:  percent of  all banks misclassified. 
g.  PPROB:  probability cutoff value approximately equal to the ratio of 
failed and nonfailed observations. 
Notes:  *  Significant at 1  percent. 
Significant at 5 percent. 
Significant at 10 percent. 
Source:  Author. 
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Best available copyTable 9 
Out-of-Sample Forcasts for Equations  (4a),  (5),and  (5a) 
A. June 1984 Call Data: 86, 87 and 88 Failures and  with 
Failures in 1986  Failures in 1987 
Equation  (4a)  (5)  (5a)  ------ 
TYPE~~ 68.421  66.165  64.662  79.781  78.689  67.213 
TYPE1  2.189  2,074  1.843  1.958  2.074  1.843 
10.989  10.589  10.190  15.509  15.414  13.225 
Failures in 1988 
Equation  (4a)  (5)  ------  (5a)  - - - - - - 
TYPE1  N/A  83.660  74.834 
TYPEI  I  N/A  2.074  1.843 
CLASS  N/A  14.328  12.659 
B.  June 1985 Call Data:  87, 88, and 89 Failures and  with 
Failures in 1987  Failures in 1988 
Equation  (4a)  (5)  (5a)  ------  (5)  ------  (5a)  ------ 
TYPEI  70.466  66.321  63.731  68.421  71.930  71.930 
TYPEI  I  2.074  2.189  1.728  2.304  2.189  1.728 
CLASS  14.515  14.138  13.007  13.186  13.956  13.282 
Failures in  . 
Equation  (4a)  (5)  (5a)  ------ 
TYPEI  N/A  83.652  75.342 
TYPEII  N/A  2.189  1.728 
CLASS  N/A  8.820  7.439 
C. June 86 Call Data:  88 and 89 Failures and  with 
Failures in 1988  Failures in 1989 
Equation  (4a)  ------  (5)  ------  (5a)  ------  (4a)  ------  (5)  - - - - - -  (5a)  ------ 
TYPEI  55.172  54.598  52.874  65.333  64.000  62.667 
TYPEI  I  3.571  2.880  3.226  3.226  2.880  3.226 
CLASS  12.188  11.516  11.516  8.165  8.059  7.953 
a.  is nonfailed holdout sample. 
b.  Type I error:  percent of failed banks classified as nonfailed. 
c.  Type II error:  percent of nonfailed banks classified as failed. 
d.  Class:  percent of all banks misclassified. 
e.  Failures for the first half of 1989. 
Source  :  Author. 
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Out-of-Sample Forcasting for Equations (4a),  (5),  and (5a) 
Using Coefficients Estimated from Logit Regressions on 1985 Failures 





TYPEI  I 
CLASS 
Equation 
June 1985 Call Data 
Failures in 1986 
(4a)  ------  (5)  -----. 
(5a) 
51.880  45.113  52.632 
1.786  1.901  0.864 
5.350  4.976  4.548 
June 1987 Call Data 
Failures in 1988 
(4a)  (5)  (5a) 
33.908  29.885  27.586 
1.786  1.184  2.074 
4.712  4.398  4.398 
In-Sample Forcast 
(4a)  (5)  (5a)  ------ 
June 1986 Call Data 
Failures in 1987 
(4a)  (5)  (5a) 
41.146  32.292  39.583 
2.074  2.074  1.728 
5.965  5.083  5.498 
June 1988 Call Data 
Failures in 1989' 
(4a)  (5)  (5a) 
33.766  25.974  22.078 
2.016  2.074  1.671 
3.365  3.223  2.537 
TYPEI  15.652  15.652  12.745 
TYPEI  I  12.730  11.636  10.211 
CLASS  12.912  11.885  10.913 
a.  Out-of-sample forecasting done with PPROB  (probability  cutoff) equal to 
0.066 (ratio of failed to nonfailed banks for the in-sample logit 
regressions). 
b.  Type I error:  percent of failed banks classified as nonfailed. 
c.  Type II error:  percent of nonfailed banks classified as failed. 
d.  Class:  percent of all banks misclassified. 
e.  Failures for the first half of 1989. 
Source:  Author. 
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